

Results from RBMI Workshop

London
29-30th January 2004

Sub-task 2.4: Health Environment and Safety (HES)



S. Selmer-Olsen, DNV



Sub-task 2.4: objectives (recap)

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
- Apply a risk based method to develop input to maintenance and inspection guidelines for a generic hydrogen refuelling station



- The RBMI method is based on the philosophy that maintenance efforts should be focused on items that constitute the largest risk
- Risk is considered to be dependent on probability and consequence of failures, where consequences may be
 - Additional costs or lost income
 - Potential injuries
 - Environmental emissions



- Optimise resources needed to **operate, inspect, maintain and improve** installations
- Do not compromise on **safety, reliability or environmental** standards.



- **Objective:**

- To develop a unified approach for making risk based decisions within inspection and maintenance planning.

- **Main deliverables:**

- A guideline for developing and maintaining a risk based inspection and maintenance plan.
- Industry specific workbooks for the **steel, chemical, power** and **petrochemical industry**.
- The technical basis for a future European standard in this area.

- **Partners:**


- **DNV (Co-ordinator)**, BV, Corus, DOW, ESB (Ireland), EnBW, ExxonMobil Chemical, Hydro Agri, JRC-Petten, MBeL, MPA, Siemens, Solvay, TNO, TÜV Süddeutschland, VTT

- **For more:**

<http://research.dnv.com/rimap>



Maintenance Planning




- The exercise:
 - RBMI on generic hydrogen refuelling station based on WP5.2
 - Risks associated with malfunction of each of the individual components of the refuelling station.
 - Some guidance on focus for maintenance efforts tfor an acceptable level of safety and operational reliability in a cost effective way.

- Participants were:
 - Peter Newbould (Air Products)
 - Pål Kittilsen (Norsk Hydro)
 - Angunn Engebø (DNV)
 - Madeleine Brien (DNV)
 - Mikael Hägerby (DNV)



Generic Refueling Station



A drawing provided previously by Air Liquide used

N° 17.05.02		CIVILLER/ALLIERS		Edition originale	
Indice	Date	Auteur	Verif.	Approb.	
= cote = Cote non à l'échelle			⊗ = Indice de contrôle		
Niveau Tolérances générales de 0 à 500 mm d'alésage sur Ø de 20 à 200 mm H12 Indications > à 500 mm H12			Niveau Angles saillant rayon 0mm Ø à 200 mm H12 à 300 mm 300 à 500 mm > à 200 mm		
ECHAUD /			EHP2		
GENE FARMOUTH F807 AIR LIQUIDE CRYOGENIE INOVATION TECHNIQUES AVANCEES BP 15 35380 SASSEVILLE FRANCE TEL. 04 78 43 80 30			GENERIC REFUELING STATION PID G11138A001A1		



- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis - a qualitative analysis that systematically examines each possible failure mode within a system.
- Failure modes of components are studied:
 - Probability of occurrence
 - Consequence
 - Prevention/detection
- Preventative actions may then be identified and prioritised



Consequence levels (ref. WP 5.2)

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Level	Description	Definition		
		People	Environment	Material damage
1	CATASTROPHIC	Several fatalities	Time for restitution of ecological resource such as recreation areas, ground water >5 years	Total loss of station and major structural damages outside station area
2	SEVERE LOSS	One fatality	Time for restitution of ecological resource 2 - 5 years	Loss of main part of station. Production interrupted for months.
3	MAJOR DAMAGE	Permanent disability Prolonged hospital treatment	Time for restitution of ecological resource < 2 years	Considerable structural damage Production interrupted for weeks
4	DAMAGE	Medical treatment Lost time injury	Local environmental damage of short duration < 1 month??	Minor structural damage Minor production influence
5	MINOR DAMAGE	Minor injury Annoyance Disturbance	Minor environmental damage	Minor



Probability levels (ref. WP 5.2)

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Level	Description	Definition	Frequency
A	IMPROBABLE	Possible, but may not be heard of, or maybe experienced world wide.	About 1 per 1000 years or less
B	REMOTE	Unlikely to occur during lifetime/operation of one filling station	About 1 per 100 years
C	OCCASIONAL	Likely to occur during lifetime/operation of one filling station	About 1 per 10 years
D	PROBABLY	May occur several times at the filling station	About 1 per year
E	FREQUENT	Will occur frequently at the filling station	About 10 per year or more.



Risk Matrix (ref. WP 5.2)

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		PROBABILITY (per year)				
		A (<0.001)	B (0.01-0.001)	C (0.1-0.01)	D (1-0.1)	E (10-1)
Consequence severity	1 (Catastrophic)	H	H	H	H	H
	2 (Severe loss)	M	H	H	H	H
	3 (Major damage)	M	M	H	H	H
	4 (Damage)	L	L	M	M	H
	5 (Minor damage)	L	L	L	L	M



➤ Based on the risk corresponding to each component and the redundancy available, three different maintenance intervals were proposed:

➤ **Frequent maintenance-**

➤ **(High risk)** routine process by operators, which could be even more often than manufacturer recommendation.

➤ **Regular maintenance-**

➤ **(Medium risk)** reflects the frequency of use or wear on the equipment and at a minimum meets manufacturer requirements.

➤ **Intermittent maintenance-**

➤ **(Low risk)** Maintenance meets manufacturer requirements but the frequency of interventions reflects consequence of equipment failure and frequency of use.



- Maintenance actions and intervals were identified for every component or type of component (in the examined filling station)

	Frequent	Regular	Intermittent
Components	5	14	8

- The dispensing unit constitutes the greatest risk for two reasons:
 - Frequent public use and maltreatment (human error)
 - Likelihood of someone being in the vicinity upon failure



- Study Limitations:
 - Appropriate time to examine detailed design component by component
 - Examined one “generic” design
 - Component detailing not uniform



- Provided input to WP2.3 on issues related to inspection and maintenance.
- The main focus was on CGH2 compressor, storage and dispenser system.
- Issues related to on site hydrogen production and LH not covered.
- The results obtained in WP5.2 used as input.



- The RBMI approach is feasible for refueling stations, but...
 - Analysis should be installation-specific
 - More detailed maintenance procedures should be included

- The time required for a detailed and complete analysis for a specific location therefore will exceed what was spent in this workshop exercise under WP 2.4



- Maintenance scheduling should consider manufacturer recommendations along with risk based findings
- Dispenser system most critical. To be operated by trained users. **Training users can reduce risks.**
- It is recommended to develop a best industry practice (code) for RBMI of refueling stations based on a more complete and validated study. EIHP3 ?
- DNV Report No. 2004-0114 issued for comments. Main comments received are now included.

